Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade? by Langenmayr, Dominika
Dominika Langenmayr:
Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing
Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2014-41
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21359/
Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes – Increasing
Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?
Dominika Langenmayr∗
University of Munich
August 12, 2014
Abstract
Many countries apply lower fines to tax evading individuals when they voluntarily
disclose the tax evasion they committed. I model such voluntary disclosure mechanisms
theoretically and show that while such mechanisms increase the incentive to evade
taxes, they nevertheless increase tax revenues net of administrative costs. I then test
the effects of voluntary disclosure in two separate empirical analyses. First, I confirm
that voluntary disclosure mechanisms increase tax evasion, using the introduction of
the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program in the U.S. for identification. Second, I
quantify the tax revenues of voluntary disclosures by considering how some state-level
governments in Germany bought whistle-blower data from foreign bank employees,
thereby increasing the detection probability and the usage of voluntary disclosures.
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1 Introduction
Households worldwide hold about 8% of their total financial wealth, almost U.S.-$
6 trillion, in tax havens (Zucman, 2013). Correspondingly, tax authorities forego high
tax revenues: Estimates for the United States show that personal income tax evasion
via offshore accounts may cost around $70 billion annually (Gravelle, 2009). The need
for tax revenues in the wake of the financial crisis has now rekindled governments’
efforts to curb such income tax evasion.
Principally, governments can fight tax evasion by individuals who hold their wealth
offshore in two ways. First, they can negotiate with tax havens to share information
regarding foreigners’ accounts. An example is the recent agreement between the United
States and Switzerland forcing Swiss banks to provide information on accounts owned
by U.S. citizens. However, such treaties are not very effective, as tax evaders rather
shift their funds to different tax havens instead of repatriating them (Johannesen and
Zucman, 2014). Second, governments can set incentives for individual taxpayers to
declare foreign wealth and the tax evaded on it.
Many countries incentivize individuals to come clean by a “voluntary disclosure”
mechanism. Usually, the prerequisite is to report all foreign asset holdings. The income
on these assets is then taxed retroactively at the standard tax rate, but no or a reduced
fine is levied. Only individuals not yet under investigation for tax evasion can profit
from such programs. Voluntary disclosure programs exist in many countries (see Table
1 for an overview), and are often part of the general law and for an unlimited period.
However, some commentators fear that the option of voluntary disclosure increases
the incidence of tax evasion, as these programs offer the possibility to escape high
punishments if individuals decide that the probability of detection has increased.
[Table 1 about here.]
The economic literature has so far barely studied voluntary disclosure programs.
Using both a theoretical model and empirical tests, the paper aims to shed some light
on this topic. First, I ask how the existence of a voluntary disclosure program affects
individuals’ tax evasion decision. In both the theoretical model and the empirical test I
show that the existence of such a program increases tax evasion. Second, I consider the
government’s point of view, studying whether the tax authorities should offer voluntary
disclosure, despite the increase in tax evasion it causes. In my model, governments
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should offer voluntary disclosure only when a disclosure lowers the administrative costs
related to assessing taxes of evaders. I then confirm the importance of administrative
costs in a survey of German competent local tax authorities. In a second empirical
test I quantify the revenues brought in by voluntary disclosure in Germany. Lastly, I
analyze how governments should fine tax evaders after a voluntary disclosure.
In more detail, my theoretical model frames tax evasion as a rational choice of
individuals that bear a moral (psychic) cost when evading taxes. There is ex-ante
uncertainty about the probability of being caught and fined, and individuals have the
possibility to voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed after the detection
probability is revealed. In equilibrium, the individuals with the lowest moral cost will
evade taxes, those with intermediate moral costs will first evade taxes but voluntarily
disclose later when the detection probability is high, and those with the highest moral
costs will never evade taxes. In this model I show that the existence of voluntary
disclosure increases the number of individuals who evade taxes. This result arises as
voluntary disclosure allows individuals to better differentiate their actions according to
the detection probability.
I later test this result empirically, using the introduction of the first Offshore Vol-
untary Disclosure Program in the U.S. in 2009 for identification. Employing a synthetic
control approach, I analyze how U.S. deposits in offshore havens have changed com-
pared to deposits from other countries. This analysis confirms that the existence of a
voluntary disclosure program indeed increases tax evasion, in line with the theoretical
model.
I also model how the government should employ voluntary disclosure. In the model,
voluntary disclosure increases net tax revenue if there are administrative costs of fining
tax evaders in the absence of a voluntary disclosure. I confirm the importance of these
administrative cost savings in a survey among German competent local tax authorities.
In the model, government optimally set voluntary disclosure fines by trading off higher
tax evasion with these savings in administrative costs. In a last step, I study shocks
to detection probabilities in Germany to gauge the additional revenue of a voluntary
disclosure. My estimates suggest that one voluntary disclosure brings in around e26,000
on average.
Several strands of literature are relevant to this paper. First, there is a large liter-
ature on tax evasion by individuals (see Slemrod (2007) for an overview). The theory
goes back to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), who model tax eva-
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sion analogous to portfolio choice. Sandmo (2005) provides a review of this line of
literature. Despite the obvious difficulties to measure tax evasion, there is also a large
empirical literature, which Alm (2012) summarizes.
To my knowledge, no paper studies a voluntary disclosure program as described
above. However, there is some literature on tax amnesties, which are short-run programs
(often about three months long) that usually do not fine tax evaders. Also in contrast
to voluntary disclosures, tax amnesties often include those already under investigation
for tax evasion and allow only a partial reporting of prior tax evasion. In this literature,
Malik and Schwab (1991) propose a model with uncertainty about the disutility from
tax evasion to explain why individuals take up the offer of a tax amnesty (which
they never would in the standard Allingham-Sandmo model). Alm and Beck (1990)
set up a prospect theory model in which the share of evaded tax that is declared in
the amnesty is the main decision parameter. Stella (1991) discusses the interaction
between future enforcement and tax amnesties, predicting that amnesties are unlikely
to generate additional revenue. Alm and Beck (1993) confirm this result empirically in
a time-series analysis.1
Closer to this paper is an analysis by Andreoni (1991), who asks how a “permanent
tax amnesty” (in effect, a voluntary disclosure program in the sense discussed above)
would affect the efficiency and equity of the tax system. He proposes a model in which
people use the amnesty when shocks to their consumption make them unwilling to bear
the risk of audit. In this model, the tax amnesty acts similar to social insurance, allowing
those in bad luck to eliminate some of their risk. He does not consider administrative
costs or the optimal fine set by the government, but assumes (as common in this
1Other papers have studied behavioural responses of individuals to temporary decreases of other
taxes. For example, Agarwal et al. (2013) show very large behavioral responses to sales tax holidays,
brief periods in which sales taxes are reduced or eliminated. They find little evidence of substitution
across products or over time. In contrast, Cole (2009) estimates that sales tax revenues decrease by
up to 8% during tax holiday months. Studying a stamp duty holiday in the UK, Besley et al. (2014)
similarly find that the tax holiday mostly leads to short-term retiming of transactions. However, due
to the specific situation of prior tax evasion, it is unclear how well these results transfer to voluntary
disclosure.
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literature) that there is no fine after a disclosure.2
In all, voluntary disclosure programs with their current characteristics (e.g. re-
quiring full disclosure, and having a specifically chosen fine as their most prominent
characteristic) have so far been an understudied aspect of tax evasion. This paper
aims to shed some light on them. Section 2 provides the theoretical model. Section 3
empirically tests some aspects of voluntary disclosure. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Framework
To illustrate the consequences of voluntary disclosure, I set up a model in which
individuals may evade capital income taxes by transferring money to an offshore ac-
count. The government can set incentives for tax evaders to come clean by offering
them the possibility to voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed. Offshore
income indicated in a voluntary disclosure is then taxed, and fined at a rate chosen by
the government.
From the government’s point of view, a voluntary disclosure has two main advan-
tages. First, it detects tax evasion that it potentially would not have exposed otherwise.
Second, a voluntary disclosure saves the government administrative costs, such as the
cost of the time spent collecting information from less-than-cooperative offshore banks.3
Individuals in the model face ex-ante uncertainty about detection probabilities.
This uncertainty reflects, for example, that there is a certain probability that an infor-
mant offers the government information about offshore accounts. Figure 1 clarifies the
real-world significance of changes in detection probabilities using the example of Ger-
many, which has bought whistle-blower information offered by former bank employees
2Some further papers study the optimal self-reporting of violations of the law in a non-tax context.
A first contribution is Kaplow and Shavell (1994), who show that self-reporting increases welfare as it
saves enforcement resources and reduces uncertainty for individuals facing potential sanctions. Their
model has been extended to consider ex-post asymmetric information (Feess and Heesen, 2002) or
self-reporting at different stages of an investigation (Feess and Walzl, 2005).
3Tax lawyers and tax authorities have confirmed in private discussions that a voluntary disclosure
often has several hundred to thousand pages, as the individual not only has to disclose all capital
income over a certain period, but also proof that the disclosure is complete.
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Figure 1: Voluntary Disclosures per Quarter in Germany
Voluntary Disclosures per quarter in Germany, Q1 2006 - Q1 2014. Graph based on information from
state finance ministries, data for 2006-2009 is extrapolated based on information for Lower Saxony
and Schleswig-Holstein.
in tax havens at a large scale. The acquisition of such data from February 2010 onward
was widely discussed in the media. In 2011, it emerged that Germany and Switzerland
had negotiated a tax treaty under which undeclared accounts of German nationals in
Switzerland would be subject to a one-time tax payment. This single tax payment was
supposed to be collected anonymously and to exempt the account holder from prose-
cution for tax evasion committed in the past. However, in November 2012, the upper
house of the German parliament did not pass this tax treaty, thus making voluntary
disclosure again the only possibility to come clean on past tax evasion.4
The model reflects such changes in the underlying detection probabilities. With
probability q, a high detection probability pH occurs (e.g. because the government
receives whistle-blower information). Correspondingly, with probability 1 − q there is
no leak and the detection probability is low (pL). This uncertainty not only reflects
the real-world facts described above, but is also necessary for the model, as rational
4See Pfisterer (2013) for an overview of these developments.
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individuals will only voluntarily disclose tax evasion they optimally chose to commit
earlier if they have received new information.5
Not all individuals have the same willingness to evade taxes. Kleven et al. (2011)
show that even among Danish tax payers who self-report their income (and thus have
the opportunity to evade taxes), less than 40% actually evade taxes. I model such
heterogeneity among individuals with a moral cost of tax evasion (αi ∈ [0;A]), which
is specific to the individual. In equilibrium, there will be three different groups of
individuals: First, a group of “non-evaders”, who have high moral costs and never
evade taxes; second, “disclosers”, who evade taxes but voluntarily disclose if the high
detection probability is drawn; and lastly “evaders”, who evade even when the high
detection probability occurs.
Individuals decide about tax evasion and voluntary disclosure by maximizing their
expected utility.6 I assume risk neutral individuals, whose utility is
Ui = y − τis − 1αi. (1)
y is the pre-tax capital income, τis is the tax (and fine) payment that depends on
individual i’s tax evasion and disclosure decisions as well as the state of the world s,
and 1 is an indicator function that is equal to one if the individual evades taxes and
zero otherwise. Due to the linear structure of the utility function, it is never optimal
to declare a share of the true income.
In the main model, I assume risk neutral, heterogeneous individuals as these as-
sumptions allow a tractable model that fits well to the stylized facts described above.
To provide robustness and make sure that risk averse individuals would not change
the main implications from the model, Appendix 1 provides a model that focusses on
5I treat the two potential detection probability as exogenous, as the government can affect them
only in the medium to long term. Tax authorities usually do not hire short-term workers as employees
have to handle sensitive tax data, and training new employees takes time. Moreover, strong job
protection rules in the public sector make short-term adjustments very costly. Other short term actions,
such as negotiating new information sharing agreements with tax havens, can be understood as an
occurrence of pH .
6There is also a part of the literature that does not rely on expected utility theory. Alm et al.
(1992) show in an experiment that some individuals overweight the low probability of audit. Dhami
and Al-Nowaihi (2010) model such behavior using prospect theory and predict a positive relationship
between tax rates and tax evasion. However, when testing whether expected utility theory or prospect
theory provide a better explanation of individuals’ behavior regarding tax evasion, King and Sheffrin
(2002) find experimental evidence in favor of expected utility theory.
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the tax evasion decision of risk averse individuals in the presence of a voluntary disclo-
sure mechanism. In that model, every individual evades some (but not all) tax. In the
presence of voluntary disclosure, every individual decides to evade more taxes than in
the benchmark case without voluntary disclosure. In sum, the main results concerning
aggregate tax evasion and tax revenues are very similar to the main model.
Individuals are liable to pay taxes at the statutory rate t. They can evade this tax
by hiding their money in an offshore account and not declaring the income derived
from it. If the tax authorities detect the tax evasion, the individual pays a fine F > 1
that is proportional to the evaded tax. I treat the fine for tax evasion, F , as exogenous,
assuming that it is set in an appropriate relation to punishments for other crimes.7
The government may allow voluntary disclosures of prior tax evasion. As is common
practice, a voluntary disclosure requires that the individual reports all income on which
he evaded taxes. Preparing a voluntary disclosure is costly for the individual, as he has
to collect all information necessary to assess his taxes. I model this with a compliance
cost cc that arises when preparing a voluntary disclosure. The individual has to pay
taxes on the income declared in the voluntary disclosure retroactively. Additionally, the
government imposes a fine f (1 ≤ f ≤ F ), which is proportional to the evaded tax. The
government sets this fine to maximize revenues. Moreover, I assume that a voluntary
disclosure clears the conscience of the individual, i.e. that after a voluntary disclosure
the individual no longer has moral qualms about the tax evasion he committed earlier.
The government incurs administrative costs ca for each tax evading individual,
as it checks and audits the tax return and collects information from offshore banks.
For the tax authorities, these costs are significantly higher than the costs that a tax-
evading individual incurs when preparing a voluntary disclosure: The tax authorities
have to investigate to detect all foreign accounts and asset holdings, and then have
to obtain detailed information on the movements of funds from less-than-cooperative
offshore banks. In contrast, the individual himself either has all this information already
available, or can (as the account holder) easily request it from his banks.
Voluntary disclosure will only take place in equilibrium if there are rents to share,
i.e. when the costs of preparing a voluntary disclosure (cc) are sufficiently lower than the
administrative costs of fining tax evaders (ca). On the other side, administrative costs
7Since the analysis of Kolm (1973), it is well known that with positive marginal costs of auditing,
the government optimally sets the fine for tax evasion to the maximum level that is in line with moral
and legal constraints. This is the implicit assumption in the model presented here.
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Figure 2: Sequence of events
Government
sets f
Evasion decision
Nature draws
pL or pH
Disclosure decision
Audits are
carried out
Tax/fine payments
may not be so high that fining tax evaders is no longer worthwhile for the government.
To make sure that these conditions are met, I assume that
cc
(1− q)(ph − pL) ≤ c
a < Fty. (2)
This condition assures that individuals are willing to disclose (left part), and that the
government is willing to fine evaders despite the administrative cost (right part).
Given these tax and fine payments and compliance cost, an individual’s utility is
U t = y − ty if no evasion,
U0 = y − αi if evasion not detected,
UF = y − Fty − αi if evasion detected,
U vd = y − fty − cc if evasion voluntarily disclosed.
Knowing these different outcomes, individuals decide about tax evasion anticipating
the full sequence of events. The government, in turn, takes individuals’ decisions into
account and sets the voluntary disclosure fine accordingly.
Figure 2 describes the stages of the game in more detail. First, the government sets
the voluntary disclosure fine f . In the second stage, individuals decide whether they
want to evade taxes. They anticipate that nature will draw the detection probability p
in the next stage. After the detection probability is revealed, individuals may have the
option to voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed. Lastly, the government
audits some taxpayers, and individuals accordingly pay taxes and fines.
2.2 Benchmark Without Voluntary Disclosure
As a benchmark, consider first the case when voluntary disclosure is not possible.
Individuals then base their evasion decision on the expected detection probability,
p¯, with p¯ = qpH + (1 − q)pL. Comparing the expected utility when evading taxes
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(
p¯UF + (1− p¯)U0) with the utility if they pay all taxes (U t) shows that individuals
with a moral cost αi < α
0 evade taxes, with α0 given by
α0 = ty (1− p¯F ) . (3)
The number of evaders is higher the higher the potential gain from tax evasion (ty),
and lower the higher the expected fine (p¯F ty).8
For later use, tax revenues net of administrative costs, T 0, are
T 0 =
∫ α0
0
p¯ (Fty − ca) dG(αi) +
∫ A
α0
tydG(αi). (4)
The first term denotes the taxes and fines net of administrative costs that the tax
authorities collect from evaders; the second term are taxes that non-evaders pay.
2.3 Voluntary Disclosure
A voluntary disclosure implies that an individual reports all income on which he
evaded taxes to the authorities. In most countries voluntary disclosures are associated
with a fine (see Table 1 for details). The voluntary disclosure fine f ≥ 1 is lower than
the fine for tax evasion (f ≤ F ), and in some countries no fine is levied (f = 1).
If nature draws the low detection probability, it cannot be rational to voluntarily
disclose – after all, the same individual chose to evade taxes when it was still unclear
whether the low or the high detection probability would arise. However, if nature draws
the high detection probability, evaders with relatively high moral costs of tax evasion
may opt for a voluntary disclosure, preferring a certain, but lower, fine payment and
clear conscience over the tax saving with the risk of a high fine if evasion is detected.
In particular, individuals will disclose if their utility after a disclosure (U vd) is higher
than the expected utility if they evade
(
pHU
F + (1− pH)U0
)
. Thus, individuals disclose
when their moral cost are αi ≥ αvd, with
αvd = ty(f − pHF ) + cc. (5)
More individuals voluntarily disclose when the fine associated with voluntary disclosure
is low. But even when there is no fine after a voluntary disclosure (f = 1), not all
8As common in the literature I assume that p¯F < 1, i.e. that tax evasion is worthwhile in expec-
tation.
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Figure 3: Behavior of individuals with different moral costs αi.
Without voluntary disclosure program:
αi
0 α0
evade never evade
With voluntary disclosure program:
αi
0 αvd αt
always evade evade, dis-
close if pH
never evade
individuals will voluntarily disclose if the detection probability pH is sufficiently low
that there still is an expected gain from tax evasion. Higher compliance costs associated
with preparing the voluntary disclosure also make it less attractive.
Even with the voluntary disclosure possibility, not everyone evades taxes. In partic-
ular, individuals with moral costs αi ≥ αt choose no evasion over evading and disclosing
when the detection probability is high, with
αt = ty
1− qf − (1− q)pLF
1− q −
q
1− q c
c. (6)
αt is larger than αvd when ty [1− f + (1− q)(pH − pL)F ] < cc. After deriving the
equilibrium fine it will become clear that this condition holds when the compliance
costs of the individual preparing the voluntary disclosure are sufficiently lower than the
administrative costs of the tax authority, i.e. when (2) is met. Under this assumption,
Figure 3 shows how the different types of individuals behave in equilibrium depending
on whether voluntary disclosure is possible or not.
Ex ante, i.e. before the detection probability is revealed, expected tax revenues net
of administrative costs when voluntary disclosure is possible are
T =
∫ αvd
0
p¯ (Fty − ca) dG(αi)+
∫ αt
αvd
[qfty + (1− q)pL(Fty − ca)] dG(αi)+
∫ A
αt
ty dG(αi).
(7)
The first term refers to the revenue collected from evaders, the second term to the
expected revenue from those who voluntarily disclose when the detection probability
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is high, and the last term to the revenue collected from non-evaders. Note that no
administrative costs arise after a voluntary disclosure, as the disclosure has to contain
all information necessary for assessing the tax liability.9
The government sets the fine that applies after a voluntary disclosure to maximize
the expected tax revenues. Assuming that there is a mass M of taxpayers with moral
costs αi distributed uniformly in the interval [0, A], Eq. (7) can be rewritten as
T = p¯ (Fty − ca) α
vdM
A
+ [qfty + (1− q)pL(Fty − ca)] (α
t − αvd)M
A
+ ty
(A− αt)M
A
,
(8)
with αvd and αt given by Eqs. (5) and (6). Maximizing Eq. (8) over f yields the optimal
voluntary disclosure fine f ∗,
f ∗ = 1 + (1− q)(pH − pL)F − (1− q)(pH − pL)c
a + cc
2ty
. (9)
The optimal fine for voluntary disclosure is higher when the fine for tax evasion (F )
is higher, and lower when the administrative costs associated with tax evasion or the
compliance costs associated with preparing the voluntary disclosure are higher. When
the difference between the detection probabilities in the two states of the world is large,
the voluntary disclosure fine is higher, because the difference in detection probabilities
increases the incentive for individuals to come clean.
For further interpretation, consider the cutoffs αvd
∗
and αt
∗
as a function of the
underlying parameters:
αvd
∗
= ty(1− p¯F )− 1
2
(1− q)(pH − pL)ca + 1
2
cc, (10)
αt
∗
= ty(1− p¯F ) + 1
2
q(pH − pL)ca − 1
2
q
1− q c
c. (11)
Clearly, when there are no administrative costs or compliance costs, αvd
∗
= αt
∗
(=
α0), i.e. the revenue-maximizing government sets the fine so high that voluntary disclo-
sure is not attractive for any evader. Comparing (10) and (11) shows that for voluntary
disclosure to take place in equilibrium, it has to hold that cc ≤ ca(1 − q)(ph − pL), as
assumed above in (2).
Next, consider how the existence of a voluntary disclosure mechanism affects the tax
evasion decision. Comparing αt with α0 from the benchmark model without voluntary
disclosure yields the following proposition:
9In principle, a much lower administrative cost also arises after a voluntary disclosure or when
assessing the tax returns of non-evaders. This cost is here normalized to zero.
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Proposition 1 A voluntary disclosure program with an optimally set fine in the pres-
ence of administrative costs increases the number of individuals that evade taxes.
Proof. Proof by contradiction: Assume αt < α0. Then, from Eqs. (3) and (11),
0 > (pH − pL)ca − c
c
1− q ,
which is a contradiction whenever parameters are such that voluntary disclosure takes
place in equilibrium (i.e. when condition (2), which followed from comparing αvd
∗
and
αt
∗
, holds).
To understand this result, consider how voluntary disclosure affects the tax evasion
decision. Voluntary disclosure can be interpreted as an option that an individual may
exercise when the detection probability proves to be high. Without this option (i.e.
in an economy without voluntary disclosure), individuals come to a decision about
evading taxes based on the expected probability of detection, p¯. In contrast, if voluntary
disclosure is possible, individuals anticipate that they can voluntarily disclose when
the detection probability is high and thus decide about tax evasion based on the low
detection probability pL and the voluntary disclosure fine f . In the extreme case of
no voluntary disclosure fine (f = 1), they evade as if the detection probability was
pL for sure. As more people evade taxes when the detection probability is lower, the
possibility of voluntary disclosure increases the number of people who evade taxes to
start with.
For a revenue-maximizing government, the higher tax evasion when a voluntary
disclosure program exists seems to be an argument against introducing such a program.
However, voluntary disclosure has several other effects on tax revenues. With voluntary
disclosure, more individuals pay tax (and the low fine f) in the state of the world with
the high detection probability, and administrative costs are lower. In contrast, in the
low detection probability state, is has clear negative effects as there is more evasion
but no voluntary disclosures take place.
To see the overall effect on tax revenues, I compare the equilibrium tax revenues
T ∗ (derived by inserting the optimal fine f ∗ and αvd∗ and αt∗ in Eq. 8) with Eq. (4),
assuming a uniform distribution of αi also in this case. This shows
T ∗ > T 0 ⇔
[cc − ca(ph − pL)(1− q)]2 q
4(1− q) > 0. (12)
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When administrative costs are positive, (12) is always fulfilled. Then, the existence of
voluntary disclosure increases tax revenues net of administrative costs. The voluntary
disclosure program offers the government a way to share into the rents that arise be-
cause individuals have a lower cost of preparing the information for assessing previously
evaded taxes than the tax authorities themselves. Thus, the government decides to use
voluntary disclosure despite the increase in tax evasion it causes.
When there are no administrative costs (ca = 0), T ∗ = T 0.10 In this case, the
government optimally sets the voluntary disclosure fine so high that no voluntary dis-
closure takes place in equilibrium (see Eqs. 11 and 10). This behavior is optimal as an
attractive voluntary disclosure program (i.e. a program with a fine sufficiently low that
there is some uptake) would increase tax evasion, without the corresponding benefit of
lower administrative costs.
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 2 If and only if there are administrative costs when assessing evaded
taxes, the existence of a voluntary disclosure program raises expected tax revenues net
of administrative costs.
Proof. See Eq. (12).
Intuitively, as long as administrative costs are positive, the voluntary disclosure
mechanism generates efficiency gains in terms of reduced collection costs. The govern-
ment can increase these efficiency gains by drawing people into the voluntary disclosure
scheme, but this implies setting a low fine and foregoing additional tax revenue. In ad-
dition, a low fine implies that evasion becomes more attractive ex ante.
2.4 Administrative Costs
Proposition 2 has shown that the government should implement a voluntary dis-
closure program if such a program is associated with lower administrative costs. If
this is not the case, the government should not use this instrument (in the model, the
government sets the fine such that no individual voluntarily discloses).
10When ca = 0, it follows from (2) that cc = 0 as it cannot be more expensive for the individual to
gather information on his tax evasion than for the tax authorities.
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The crucial assumption is that the administrative costs for the tax authorities are
significantly lower when they assess evaded taxes on the basis of a voluntary disclo-
sure, compared to a situation in which the tax authorities have detected the tax evasion
themselves. As mentioned above, a voluntary disclosure usually has to contain all infor-
mation necessary to assess taxes, and usually includes a revised tax return. Having this
information prepared in a structured form likely lowers administrative costs for the tax
authorities. However, it is also possible that most work arises when checking the accu-
racy of the disclosure. In that case, voluntary disclosures would not save administrative
costs.
Only the tax authorities themselves can answer which of these arguments predom-
inates in reality. Therefore, I have carried out a survey among all regional tax offices in
Germany. I received answers from 12 of the 16 states. In eight cases, an agency at the
level of the state answered, usually based on its own survey among the competent local
tax authorities. From four other states, I directly received answers from competent
local tax authorities, so that I have a total of 18 individual answers.
My first question asked whether a voluntary disclosure increased or decreased the
work time necessary to assess taxes, compared to a situation where the evasion has al-
ready been detected (e.g. by receiving whistle-blower information). A strong majority
(∼ 60%) noted that administrative effort is significantly lower after a voluntary disclo-
sure. When asked to quantify by how much the working time decreased, the answers
ranged from 30% to 90%, with two thirds citing a decrease in the necessary work time
above 80%.11 Overall, a majority of respondents confirmed the argument made above
that a voluntary disclosure strongly decreases the administrative effort necessary to
assess previously evaded taxes.
A second question gauged the absolute volume of administrative costs, by asking
about the hours of work necessary to assess taxes after a voluntary disclosure. The
answers ranged from ”minutes” to several months, with an average of five days. This
range has to be expected, given that the voluntary disclosures concern very different
cases: They range from individuals who forgot to file a foreign account in a single year,
to others who have multiple offshore accounts with holdings in several funds, where
11About 16% of participants answered that the necessary work time increased, giving fact-checking
efforts as the main reason. However, none of these respondents gave a numerical estimate by how
much the required work time increased. The remainder stated that the work time does not change or
did not answer, noting that the answer varies too much case by case.
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all realizations of capital gains in the last ten years have to be retraced. Interestingly,
those competent local tax authorities who gave relatively high work time estimates also
were more likely to answer that voluntary disclosure substantially lowers administrative
costs. Possibly these local authorities deal predominantly with large cases, where the
potential gains from voluntary disclosures are higher than for small cases.
All in all, the survey evidence confirms that for many competent tax authorities,
voluntary disclosures implies administrative cost that are substantially (up to 90%)
lower than when assessing taxes based on whistle-blower information. In this situation
the model predicts that government allows voluntary disclosures and fines them at a
relatively low rate, as is the case in Germany (see Section 3.2).
3 Empirical Analysis
In the following, I empirically test some aspects of voluntary disclosure. The main
test considers Proposition 1, i.e. whether voluntary disclosure increases tax evasion. In
a second test, I analyze a shock to the detection probability to gauge the size of the
tax revenues effects.
First, I study how the introduction of a voluntary disclosure program in the U.S.
in 2009 affected tax evasion. In the model, this corresponds to comparing the case
with voluntary disclosure with the one without it (see Figure 3). In Proposition 1 the
model predicted that introducing voluntary disclosure increases tax evasion. To test
this effect, I use data on offshore account balances, comparing the offshore deposits
of U.S. residents with those from various control countries using a synthetic control
method.
Moreover, the model predicts that voluntary disclosures take place only when the
high detection probability occurs, and that the voluntary disclosures lead to increased
net tax revenues. An event that came close to such an exogenous increase in the de-
tection probability is the acquisition of whistle-blower data of Swiss bank accounts by
German tax authorities in early 2010. Figure 1 on page 6 confirmed that this acquisi-
tion was indeed associated with a strong increase in the use of voluntary disclosures.
Section 3.2 uses this development to estimate the additional revenue raised by volun-
tary disclosures. This estimation is no true test of Proposition 2, as the counterfactual
revenue without the voluntary disclosure program is unknown. In contrast, it compares
the situation in which nature has drawn pL with one in which nature has drawn pH .
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It thus gives an estimate of the average size of voluntary disclosures, a helpful number
when discussing the policy consequences of this analysis.
3.1 United States: Voluntary Disclosure and Tax Evasion
3.1.1 Background
The U.S. introduced a voluntary disclosure program in 2009. The IRS already ex-
perimented with voluntary disclosure programs in the first half of the twentieth century.
However, since 1952, no formal policy regarding the civil penalties for intentional tax
evaders has existed until 2009.12 In the criminal prosecution of tax evaders, individuals
who came forward voluntarily have long been treated more favorably. Nevertheless, the
2009 initiative was the first large program to introduce a significantly more favorable
civil tax penalty.13 Therefore, the introduction of the voluntary disclosure program
significantly affected the expected penalties perceived by U.S. residents.
The 2009 program ran from mid-March till mid-October 2009 and was consid-
ered a success: About 15,000 taxpayers voluntarily disclosed prior tax evasion (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2014). In February 2011, the IRS announced a
follow-up program (the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative), which ended
in mid-September 2011. Again, a large number of taxpayers (about 18,000) took ad-
vantage of this program. Ultimately, the IRS began an open-ended offshore voluntary
disclosure program (OVDP) in January 2012. Table 2 provides an overview of some
of the locations of foreign accounts declared in the 2009 program, showing that they
referred to many different countries.
[Table 2 about here.]
12An exception was a three-month program in 2003 (the 2003 offshore voluntary compliance initia-
tive), which was aimed mostly at taxpayers who used offshore payment cards. As only 1,321 taxpayers
used the 2003 initiative, I will in the following focus on the program started in 2009. For more infor-
mation on the history of voluntary disclosure in the U.S. see Madison (2001) and U.S. Government
Accountability Office (2013).
13According to an example by the IRS, tax and penalty payments for a foreign account with $
1 million and 5% yearly interest would accrue to $368,000 after a voluntary disclosure in the 2009
program, compared to $2,306,000 without the voluntary disclosure (IRS, 2009).
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All three initiatives had relatively similar requirements.14 They referred specifi-
cally to unreported income from undisclosed offshore accounts for years after 2003.
Individual taxpayers disclosing income in the program have to pay the full amount of
tax, plus interest, and a monetary penalty of up to 25% of unpaid taxes. Moreover,
there is an additional penalty of 20% (2009 program), 25% (2011 initiative) or 27.5%
(2012 program) of the value of the assets in the foreign bank accounts. These penal-
ties are significantly lower than the general punishments for tax evasion or failure to
declare foreign accounts.15 Table 3 gives an overview of the taxes and penalties paid
by participants in the 2009 OVDP.
[Table 3 about here.]
I use the introduction of the first program in 2009 to estimate how the existence
of voluntary disclosure has affected tax evasion activities. While the 2009 program was
only temporary, it marked a definite change in the IRS’ policy towards tax evaders:
for the first time since 1952, a broad and encompassing scheme for repentant tax
evaders was put in place. While no follow-up program was originally announced, the
IRS’ formal acknowledgement that it treats tax evaders who come forward voluntarily
in a more lenient way likely constitutes a significant shift in the perceived treatment
of tax evaders.16 It is therefore suited to test Proposition 1 despite formally being a
temporary program.17
14For details, see the IRS homepage at www.irs.gov/uac/2009-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-
Program, www.irs.gov/uac/2011-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative and www.irs.gov/uac/2012-
Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program.
15Civil penalties for tax evasion are the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the total balance of the
foreign account. In addition, criminal penalties of up to $500,000 or up to 10 years of imprisonment
are possible for the failure to file a report of foreign bank and financial accounts (OECD, 2010a).
16In Question & Answer section for the 2009 voluntary disclosure program, the IRS states that
“taxpayers run a substantial risk that (...) the terms will be less beneficial to taxpayers” in the future
(IRS, 2009). By noting that terms will be “less beneficial”, the IRS implicitly indicated that there
would still be a somewhat beneficial treatment of voluntary disclosures after the formal program
ended.
17The only country that recently introduced voluntary disclosure into the general law was Switzer-
land in 2010. However, as a general shift in the policy towards tax evaders took place in Switzerland
around that time, it is not possible to analyze the consequences that the introduction of voluntary
disclosure had there.
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3.1.2 Data and Descriptives
By its nature, data on tax evasion is scarce. I therefore proxy for tax evasion using
the deposits of U.S. residents in an aggregate of offshore banking centres. The Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) provides this data on a quarterly basis. It collects the
information necessary to compile this dataset from local banks in cooperation with the
respective countries’ central banks. The offshore banking centers in this aggregate are
the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Curac¸ao (from Q4 2010), Guernsey,
Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Macao, Netherlands Antilles (to Q3 2010), Panama,
and Singapore.18
The BIS designates these countries as offshore financial centers. At the same time,
the economic literature identifies all of these countries as tax havens (Hines and Rice,
1994). In the following analysis, I make the assumption that the combination of bank
secrecy and low tax rates makes these offshore financial centers a potentially attractive
location for tax evaders. Table 4 gives an overview of the amount of assets held in these
offshore banking centres, and shows that these assets make up a significant fraction of
the overall assets U.S. residents hold abroad.
[Table 4 about here.]
There are some potential issues with measuring tax evasion indirectly by foreign
assets: First, it is not clear if these deposits really belong to individuals. Johannesen
and Zucman (2014) show that households hold at least 50% of the tax haven deposits.
Second, it is possible that individuals do pay tax on this income. There is, however,
little reasons except tax evasion for individuals to hold assets in the very small countries
in the offshore banking aggregate.19
A further potential problem when studying the introduction of voluntary disclosure
in the U.S. is the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), which went into
effect on March 18, 2010, about a year after the introduction of voluntary disclosure.
It requires foreign financial institutions to report relevant information on their U.S.
18Unfortunately, data is only available for the aggregate of all offshore banking centers, not for
individual offshore countries.
19Johannesen and Zucman (2014) also show that tax treaties signed by a tax haven significantly
decrease deposits held in this haven, confirming that tax haven deposits are a reasonable proxy for
evaded taxes. I will discuss later how the signing of tax treaties may impact the results.
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clients to the IRS. However, it applies only to transactions made after December 31,
2012.20 U.S. residents likely adjusted their portfolios sometime after FATCA was passed
and before it went into effect. In this study, I thus focus on the two years after the
introduction of voluntary disclosure, ending the observation period in the first quarter
of 2011, well before FATCA went into effect.
3.1.3 Research Design
I use the synthetic control method, which Abadie et al. (2010) developed specifi-
cally to analyze the effectiveness of policy interventions at an aggregate level.21 This
method extends the difference-in-differences framework to allow that the effects of un-
observed variables on the outcome vary over time. It proceeds by creating a control
region (“synthetic U.S.”) from a weighted average of other countries without policy
changes (the “donor pool”). The weights are chosen so that the synthetic U.S. are as
similar as possible to the U.S. Specifically, denoting the vector of preintervention vari-
ables for the treated country by X1, and a matrix with characteristics of the potential
control countries by X0, the synthetic control method chooses the weights W used in
forming the synthetic control to minimize
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ), where V is
a positive semidefinite matrix chosen to minimize the mean square prediction error
over the pretreatment period. An important advantage of this method is that the data
choose the control group, instead of the researcher.
The BIS has made available the data on deposits in offshore banking centers of
counterparties from most OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States). I discard from the donor pool the
countries that also significantly changed their voluntary disclosure program in the time
period (France, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey and the United King-
dom). I also drop Germany due to the special circumstances described in Section 3.2,
and Norway due to a large field experiment that was carried out on the full population
of offshore tax evaders (Bott et al., 2014). As almost all counterparty countries signed
tax treaties with one or some of the countries in the offshore banking aggregate, I
20The implementation of FATCA usually requires intergovernmental agreements. The U.S. signed
such agreements with the countries in the offshore banking aggregate only in late 2013 and early 2014.
21For other applications of this method see e.g. Kleven et al. (2013) or Hinrichs (2012).
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cannot drop these counterparties. No country, however, has signed tax treaties with
all offshore banking centers in the sample period. The data set is on a quarterly basis,
starting in the first quarter of 2006, so that data on twelve pre-intervention quarters is
available.
The outcome variable of interest, Liab, are the deposits in offshore banking centers
held by residents of various countries (“counterparty countries”). I use the BIS variable
“All instruments”, which includes deposits, holdings of securities, and other liabilities of
the offshore banks towards residents in the counterparty countries. I scale the deposits
by the GDP of the counterparty country.
I then construct the synthetic United States to match the real United States as
closely as possible. I do so in two ways: First, I construct this synthetic control based
only on prior values of Liab, using the lag of the last quarter before the introduction of
voluntary disclosure (Q4 2008), and then every other quarter going back to Q2 2006.
Second, I match on two additional variables: per capita GDP to control for differences
in available income, and the capital tax rate as provided in the OECD tax database
to measure different incentives for evading taxes on capital income. In the following
section I focus on the second case. Appendix 2 presents results when matching only on
prior values of Liab.
3.1.4 Results
Using the approach described above and matching on per capita GDP, the capital
tax rate and prior values of Liab, I find that a combination of Canada (77.1%), Austria
(10.0%), Luxembourg (6.7%) and Sweden (6.2%) matches the United States best. All
other countries obtain a zero weight in the construction of the synthetic United States.
During the period studied, there were only a few tax treaties between these coun-
tries and offshore banking centers: between Canada and the Netherlands Antilles,
signed on August 29, 2009, between Sweden and Guernsey and Jersey, signed on Oc-
tober 28, 2008, and Sweden and Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, signed in April
2009.22 These tax treaties affect only a few of the countries included in the offshore
banking aggregate. Moreover, if tax evaders shifted their deposits from one of these
countries to other tax havens in response to the treaties (as suggested by Johannesen
and Zucman, 2014), they likely shifted them to another offshore banking center.
22Based on tax treaty information from Johannesen and Zucman (2014).
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Figure 4: Trends in Liab: United States vs. synthetic United States
Figure 4 shows how the offshore deposits of residents of the United States (solid
line) and its synthetic counterpart (dashed line) evolved during the period Q1 2006
to Q1 2011. Before the voluntary disclosure initiative in 2009, the deposits of the
synthetic United States follow those of the real United States reasonably closely. Thus,
the synthetic control should be a sensible approximation of how the United States
would have behaved if they had not introduced voluntary disclosure.
After the introduction of voluntary disclosure in the first quarter of 2009, the
offshore deposits of the United States clearly diverge from their synthetic counterpart.
Relative to the synthetic control, the deposits of U.S. residents rise significantly.23
This development is in line with the prediction from the model that the existence of
a voluntary disclosure program, and thus the ability to come clean at a relatively low
cost when circumstances warrant it, increases tax evasion.
In Figure 4, there is a noticeable decrease in the offshore deposits of the synthetic
23In absolute values, the offshore deposits of the U.S. fall, and those of the synthetic control fall
even more. This decrease is likely due to the growing public and political pressure against tax havens
in early 2009, which culminated in the announcement of the G20 at its London summit in April 2009
that it would crack down on tax havens (for details see Johannesen and Zucman, 2014).
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control in early 2010. This fall is likely due to the Euro crisis, as the synthetic control
partially consists of Euro member countries. It is thus not clear how well the synthetic
control replicates the U.S. in 2010. Nevertheless, also when considering only 2009,
offshore liabilities of the U.S. are considerably higher than those of their synthetic
counterpart.
Could something other than the voluntary disclosure program be driving these re-
sults? One possible alternative explanation is the election of Barack Obama as president
of the United States. The election of a Democrat may have raised fears of higher capital
taxes, which may in turn have increased the incentive to hide money offshore. How-
ever, while Barack Obama was inaugurated in January 2009, he was already elected
in September 2008, one quarter before the U.S. starts to diverge from its synthetic
counterpart. Moreover, recent literature shows that a higher marginal tax rate has at
most a very small effect on tax evasion (Kleven et al., 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable
to believe that the introduction of voluntary disclosure was an important determinant
of the increased tax evasion in Figure 4.
To evaluate the significance of the visual result from Figure 4, one has to consider
if chance alone could be driving it. To evaluate this, I carry out placebo tests where I
randomly select a country instead of the United States as the treated country. If the
placebo studies show that the gap estimated for the U.S. is unusually large relative
to the gaps of the countries that did not introduce voluntary disclosure, the present
analysis provides significant evidence of an effect of voluntary disclosure.
Figure 5 shows the results of this placebo test. It applies the synthetic control
method to every country in the donor pool. Each line in Figure 5 represents the gap
between Liab of the treated and the synthetic control for one country. The gray lines
show the gap for countries in the donor pool, and the black line denotes the gap
estimated for the United States.24 The placebo test shows that the high values of Liab
in 2009 to 2011 are unlikely to arise by chance, confirming the theoretical result that
the introduction of voluntary disclosure leads to more tax evasion.
To test the robustness of these results, I repeat the analysis matching only on prior
values of Liab, as Abadie et al. (2010) originally suggested. In this case, the synthetic
24As in Abadie et al. (2010), I drop countries that have a preintervention mean squared prediction
error at least double that of the United States. This step is necessary as convex combinations of other
countries cannot reproduce all countries sufficiently well, leading to some mean squared prediction
errors that are many times larger than that of the United States.
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Figure 5: Placebo test
United States are a combination of Denmark (79.5%), Sweden (8.2%), Luxembourg
(7.2%) and Austria (5.1%). Despite this different control group, the results (reported
in Appendix 2 in more detail) are very similar to the analysis with controls presented
above. The result of increased tax evasion is thus robust to different choices of the
synthetic control group.
3.2 Germany: Voluntary disclosure and tax revenues
3.2.1 Background
Germany has a long-established voluntary disclosure program in its general tax law.
It treats a voluntary disclosure as a means to return to “tax honesty” and does not
punish tax evasion if the taxpayer voluntarily discloses the tax evasion before the tax
authorities start an investigation. For a successful voluntary disclosure, an individual
has to report all taxes evaded in the last ten years. He then has to repay the taxes
evaded in this ten-year period, plus a 6% interest payment per year. There is no fine
(beyond the heightened interest rate) after a voluntary disclosure.25
25For details (in German) see Wittig (2014).
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The possibility of a penalty-free voluntary disclosure has led to public discussion
after some German federal states bought data sets provided by informants from tax
haven banks. This significantly increased the (perceived) detection probabilities for
tax evasion. The German state of Northrhine-Westphalia bought the first large dataset
on February 26th, 2010.26 It contained information on the names and credit balances
of German-owned accounts in Switzerland. The state of Northrhine-Westphalia, co-
financed by the federal government of Germany, paid e2.5 million to an unknown
informant. Since then, Germany has bought several other additional CDs with data
on accounts in Switzerland and Luxembourg. The data have been shared freely among
the German federal states, which are the jurisdictions in charge of all tax collections,
including federal income taxes.
3.2.2 Research Design
In the theoretical setting presented in Section 2, a higher detection probability
induces some individuals who chose to evade taxes earlier to voluntarily disclose. This
empirical test provides some first evidence to quantify the additional tax revenue these
voluntary disclosures bring in.
I use that German statistics separate income tax revenues into different categories.27
One such category is the veranlagte Einkommensteuer, self-reported income tax, which
summarizes all revenue collected from self-reported income, such as entrepreneurial
income, interest income received on foreign bank accounts, and revenue raised after a
voluntary disclosure. In contrast, interest and dividend income earned within Germany,
or on foreign assets held in a deposit at a German bank, are subject to Abgeltungsteuer,
capital income withholding tax. Banks deduct this tax automatically, so that there is
no scope for tax evasion. In the following I will employ a difference-in-difference (DiD)
design, testing how the increase in the detection probability after the acquisition of
the first whistle-blower data set in February 2010 changed the self-reported income tax
26Already in 2006, Germany acquired a dataset containing information on around 800 Luxembour-
gian bank accounts. This dataset was smaller than those bought after 2010, which sometimes contained
several ten thousand accounts. For details, see FAZ (2011).
27The data in this section is from the GENESIS data base provided by the German Federal Statistical
Office.
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revenue relative to the capital income withholding tax revenue.28
The validity of the DiD analysis rests on the assumption of common trends before
the intervention. This precondition implies that without the treatment, the dependent
variable of treated and control groups would move in the same direction. Figure 6
shows yearly tax revenues in both tax categories to provide some evidence that this
assumption holds. Revenues from self-reported income tax, and from capital income
withholding tax, both increase from 2006-2008, then fall in 2009. These movements
are broadly in line with the overall economic development in Germany in these years.
In 2010, after the acquisition of the whistle-blower data, the revenues for the two tax
collection methods diverge: while withholding tax revenues continue to decline, revenues
from self-reported income tax revenues increase, implying that the additional revenues
from voluntary disclosures overcompensate the negative trend in tax revenues.
3.2.3 Results
Table 5 reports results from this DiD test. In Col. (1), it shows that a higher detec-
tion probability in Germany led to an increase in tax revenues of about e468 million
over the next year (Col. 1). Therefore, voluntary disclosures in Germany contribute
significantly to tax revenues.
[Table 5 about here.]
Columns (2) to (4) report several robustness tests. First, Col. (2) repeats the test
using quarterly data, adding quarter fixed effects. Consistent with the results using
yearly data, I find that the voluntary disclosures lead to a tax revenue increase of e117
million per quarter. Second, I use other tax revenues as control groups to ascertain that
no unobserved change in the capital income withholding tax revenue drives the result.
Specifically, I use revenues from payroll tax (Lohnsteuer) in Col. (3) and from other
28In a more dynamic setting a higher detection probability would also lead to less tax evasion in
later periods. This change would primarily increase the capital income withholding tax revenue, as
most people invest via a domestic bank when not evading taxes. German banks withhold taxes on
capital income also when the capital is invested in foreign assets. Simply declaring wealth held abroad
on which taxes were evaded earlier is a highly risky strategy, as this attracts attention from auditors,
and most high-income individuals in Germany are audited. Thus, as lower tax evasion mostly affects
capital income withholding tax revenue, the revenue estimates from the DiD test should reflect only
the direct revenue effect of voluntary disclosures.
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Figure 6: Revenues of veranlagte Einkommensteuer, self-reported income tax, and
Abgeltungsteuer, capital income withholding tax, 2006-2010.
withheld income taxes (nicht veranlagte Steuern vom Ertrag), which mostly consists of
capital income tax paid by firms, in Col. (4). In both cases I get similar results, albeit
not significant when using other withheld income taxes as the control.
Lastly, I consider the additional revenue a voluntary disclosure brings in on aver-
age. All German federal states have answered queries about the number of voluntary
disclosures, yielding a total of 28,329 voluntary disclosures in 2010 (see Figure 1). Com-
paring this number to the average for the years 2006 to 2009, the increased detection
probability in Germany in 2010 caused about 18,100 additional voluntary disclosures.
Based on these numbers and the main results from Col. (1), the average additional
revenues per voluntary disclosure are e26,000. Considering that taxes for the last ten
years have to be paid after a voluntary disclosure, this number is relatively modest: At
the standard tax rate of 25%, this implies undeclared capital income around e100,000
over this ten year period.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides some first results on the effects of voluntary disclosure of tax
evasion, a topic that has so far not been studied in the economics literature. The the-
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oretical model has pointed out that the existence of a voluntary disclosure mechanism
increases tax evasion. The empirical analysis considering the introduction of voluntary
disclosure in the U.S. has confirmed this effect. Nevertheless, for a revenue-maximising
government, a voluntary disclosure program can be sensible as it provides a way to col-
lect revenues without incurring high administrative costs for prosecuting tax evaders.
Evidence from Germany has shown that these administrative costs are significant, and
also provided some estimates for the revenues that voluntary disclosures can bring in.
The topic of voluntary disclosures is especially relevant today, as the detection prob-
abilities for tax evaders have gone up in many countries (e.g. due to whistle-blowers or
to better information exchange with tax havens). Therefore, voluntary disclosures have
recently played a larger role. In this environment, a voluntary disclosure program is
attractive for the government, as it can increase its revenues without overburdening its
tax administration. When governments expect further increases in the detection prob-
ability, the model predicts they should increase the fine that applies after a voluntary
disclosure.
As this paper is the first to study voluntary disclosures, it has been able to shed
light on only some of its aspects. A possible extension might consider a situation in
which the tax authority has a fixed budget (at least in the short term) and has to
allocate its money between catching evaders and prosecuting caught evaders; i.e. it has
to trade off a higher detection probability versus the administrative costs of assessing
the tax returns of former evaders. A voluntary disclosure program clearly alleviates
this tradeoff.
Further arguments concerning voluntary disclosure programs lie outside the
revenue-maximization framework provided in this paper. On moral grounds, volun-
tary disclosure may be desirable as it offers a good way to come clean for taxpayers
who have made unintentional errors when filing their tax returns, or inherited offshore
accounts. In contrast, opponents of voluntary disclosure question the fairness of allow-
ing tax evaders to come clean with a very low or even no punishment. In any case,
the topic of voluntary disclosures of tax evasion clearly provides interesting further
research questions and scope for discussion.
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Appendix 1: Model with Risk Averse Individuals
This appendix considers the implications of risk averse individuals in the model
described in Section 2. Assume that individuals are homogenous (i.e. that αi = 0 for
all individuals) and maximize a well-behaved utility function U(·), with U ′ > 0 and
U ′′ < 0. For simplicity, assume that there is no compliance cost when preparing the
voluntary disclosure. As the focus of this extension is on the risk averse individual’s
decision, I do not analyze the behavior of the government here, and instead assume that
the fine after a voluntary disclosure is zero (f = 1), as is the case in several countries
(see Table 1).
Each individual receives an exogenous income y, but can choose to declare x ≤ y
on his tax return. The utility if evasion is detected is UF = U [y − tx− Ft(y − x)],
and the corresponding utility if evasion is not detected is U0 = U [y − tx]. If evasion is
voluntarily disclosed, the utility is U vd = U [y − ty]. Following Allingham and Sandmo
(1972), I assume that parameters are such that tax evasion is worthwhile ex-ante, i.e.
that p¯F = [(1− q)pL + qpH ]F < 1; and that pHF > 1, which implies that tax evasion
is no longer worthwhile when the high detection probability occurs.
First, consider again the benchmark case without voluntary disclosure. In this
benchmark model, which I denote by a hat on all decision variables, the individuals’
expected utility is given by
ÊU = q
[
pHÛF + (1− pH) Û0
]
+ (1− q)
[
pLÛF + (1− pL) Û0
]
. (A.1)
The first order condition that implicitly determines the individual’s choice of xˆ∗ is
p¯ÛF
′
(F − 1)− (1− p¯)Û0′ = 0. (A.2)
The optimal choice of the declared income, xˆ∗, trades off the probability of being caught
and fined against the expected tax saving.
Expected tax revenue net of administrative costs in this benchmark case without
voluntary disclosure, expressed per individual, is
T̂ = txˆ+ p¯F t(y − xˆ)− p¯ca. (A.3)
Next, consider how these outcomes change when voluntary disclosure is possible.
As in the main model, individuals will only exercise the option to voluntarily disclose
the tax evasion they rationally decided to commit earlier if nature draws pH .
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Expected utility if voluntary disclosure is possible is
EU = qU vd + (1− q) [pLUF + (1− pL)U0] . (A.4)
The first term describes utility when the individual chooses to voluntarily disclose,
and the second and third term depict the outcome when the low detection probability
occurs and the individual either pays the fine (2nd summand) or successfully evades
taxes (3rd summand).
Tax payers declare the income x∗ that maximizes Eq. (A.4). The corresponding
first order condition is (after simplifying)
pLU
F ′(F − 1)− (1− pL)U0′ = 0. (A.5)
Due to the voluntary disclosure possibility, only the outcomes in the state of the world
with the low detection probability matter for the tax evasion decision. If the high
detection probability occurs, the individual voluntary reports himself and pay the full
tax liability.
Expected tax revenues per individual when voluntary disclosure is possible are
T = qty + (1− q) [tx+ pLFt(y − x)− pLca] . (A.6)
If nature draws the high detection probability (which occurs with probability q), tax
revenue is ty, as all individuals voluntarily disclose. Taxes are only evaded when the
detection probability is low. Then, tax revenues are an average of successful evasion
and full taxation plus fines, minus administrative costs.
Now consider how the option of voluntary disclosure affects tax evasion, i.e. x∗.
Comparing the first oder conditions (A.2) and (A.5) gives
p¯ÛF
′
(F − 1)− (1− p¯)Û0′ = pL(F − 1)UF ′ − (1− pL)U0′, (A.7)
Note that p¯ > pL and correspondingly 1−p¯ < 1−pL. Thus, for the equality in Eq. (A.7)
to be fulfilled, it has to hold that ÛF
′
< UF
′
and Û0
′
> U0
′
, as U0 and UF move into
opposite directions when x changes. Due to the concavity of the utility function, this
implies that xˆ∗ > x∗, i.e. that more tax is evaded (lower x) when voluntary disclosure
is possible. This result is analogous to Proposition 1 from the main model.
More tax evasion could imply that a voluntary disclosure mechanism decreases tax
revenues. However, voluntary disclosure could also increase expected tax revenues, as
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some individuals voluntary disclose whose tax evasion would not have been detected
otherwise. These effects can be seen by comparing Eqs. (A.3) and (A.6):
T − Tˆ = −(1− q)(1− pLF )t(xˆ− x)− qt(pHF − 1)(y − xˆ) + qpHca. (A.8)
The first summand shows that if voluntary disclosure is possible, individuals evade
more taxes, which lowers tax revenues in the state of the world with the low detection
probability. The second summand reflect the effects if the state of the world with the
high detection probability occurs. If there are no administrative costs associated with
assessing taxes of evaders who have not disclosed (i.e. ca = 0), then Eq. (A.8) is clearly
negative; again showing that without administrative cost savings, there is no rationale
for a voluntary disclosure program for a revenue-maximizing governments even when
individuals are risk averse.
Appendix 2: Alternative matching for U.S. Empirical
Test
This appendix repeats the analysis in Section 3.1, but matches only on lagged
values of Liab to create the synthetic control. Then, a combination of Denmark (79.5%),
Sweden (8.2%), Luxembourg (7.2%) and Austria (5.1%) match the United States best.
Figure A.1 shows how the offshore deposits of residents of the United States (solid
line) and its synthetic counterpart (dashed line) evolved during the period Q1 2006 to
Q1 2010. Again, offshore deposits of U.S. residents increase strongly after the voluntary
disclosure program is introduced in 2009.
The placebo test that assigns the intervention to all donor countries in the sample
confirms that this increase is unlikely to arise by change (Figure A.2). Again, the gray
lines show the gap for countries in the donor pool, and the the black line denotes the
gap estimated for the United States.
35
Figure A.1: Trends in Liab: United States vs. synthetic United States
Figure A.2: Placebo test
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Tables
Table 1: Voluntary Disclosure in OECD Countries
Country Legal Basis Tax & Interest Penalty
Tax Interest Monetary Imprisonment
Australia General law Full amount Varies Varies Possible
Austria General law Full amount 2.38% No No
Belgium General law Full amount 7.00% 0-10% of tax No
Canada General law Full amount Yes No No
Chile General law Full amount 1.50% 10-300% of tax ≤ 15 years
Czech Rep. General law Full amount Ca. 15% No No
Denmark General law Full amount Varies 50% of tax Possible
Estonia General law Full amount 0.06%/day ≤ 18,000 EEK Possible
Finland General law Full amount Yes 30% of tax ≤ 4 years
France Special program
(2009, 2013-14)
Full amount 0.4%/month Varies No
Germany General law Full amount 6.00% No No
Greece Special program 5% to 8% of
total capital
No No
Hungary General law Full amount 1.5-1.75x
std. rate
Only height-
ened interest
No
Iceland None – – – –
Ireland General law Full amount Varies 3-10% of tax No
Israel Special program
(2011-2012)
Full amount No No No
Italy General law Full amount Varies Reduced No
Special program
in 2008
5% of assets No penalty
Japan General law Full amount 4-14.6% Varies ≤ 10 years
Korea General law Full amount 0.03%/day Reduced Varies
Luxembourg General law Full amount 0.6%/month ≤ 10% of tax No
Mexico General law Full amount Yes No Rarely
Special program
in 2009
4-7% No No
Netherlands General law Full amount Varies ≤ 300% of tax No
Special program
in 2009, 2013
Same as gen-
eral law
No penalties
New
Zealand
General law Full amount Varies Reduced No
Norway General law Full amount Yes No No
Poland General law Full amount 75% of regu-
lar rate
No No
Portugal General law Full amount 4.08% Reduced No
Special program
in 2009
5% of discl.
assets
None No No
Slovak Rep. General law Full amount Yes No No
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Slovenia General law Full amount Increased No Possible
Spain General law Full amount Yes 5-20% No
Sweden General law Full amount Yes No No
Switzerland General law
(since 2010)
Full amount Yes None, if repeat
offender ≥ 20%
of tax
No
Turkey General law Full amount Yes No No
Special program
in 2009
2% or 5% of
tax base
No No
United General law Full amount Varies Reduced No
Kingdom Special program
in 2009/2010
Full amount 10-20% of tax No
United
States
Special program
2009, 2011, 2012
Full amount Varies 20% of tax,
20-27.5% of off-
shore balance
No
Table based on information from OECD (2010b), updated with information from tax authority
and tax consultancy homepages.
Table 2: Location of Foreign Bank Accounts, 2009 OVDP
Country Frequency Percent
Switzerland 5,427 42%
United Kingdom 1,058 8%
Canada 556 4%
France 528 4%
Israel 510 4%
Germany 484 4%
Hong Kong 362 3%
Singapore 156 1%
Cayman Islands 148 1%
Isle of Man 90 1%
Jersey 72 1%
Bahamas 69 1%
Locations of foreign bank accounts reported in the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program, selected
countries. Data from U.S. Government Accountability Office (2014).
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Table 3: Accounts, Tax Payments and Penalties from 2009 OVDP
Mean 10th Pctl. Median 90th Pctl. Total
Offshore account balance 1,923,310 78,315 568,735 4,054,505 28.9 bn
Tax and interest 127,326 155 16,234 247,528 1.9 bn
OVDP penalty 375,879 13,320 107,949 793,166 5.6 bn
Account balances, tax and penalty payments within 2009 OVDP for 2003-2008 in U.S.-$. The account
balance is an estimate for the highest balance between 2003 and 2008. Data from U.S. Government
Accountability Office (2014), totals are own extrapolations.
Table 4: Foreign Asset Holdings of U.S. Residents
2006 2009 2012
Assets held abroad (total) $ 3,205bn $ 4,193bn $ 4,132bn
Assets in offshore centers $ 1,298bn $ 1,634bn $ 1,263bn
All variables are for U.S. residents. Source: BIS.
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Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post -233,315∗∗ -58,329∗∗ -453,809∗∗∗ 31,770
(0.023) (0.022) (0.005) (0.521)
Treated 935,885∗∗ 233,971∗∗ -6,734,296∗∗∗ 933,892∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.032 ) (0.006) (0.005)
PostTreated 468,476∗∗ 117,119∗∗ 688,970∗∗∗ 203,391
(0.014) (0.018) (0.006) (0.148)
Observations 64 256 64 64
R2 0.117 0.108 0.173 0.093
This table shows results from a DiD test that considers the acquisition of whistle-blower information
on tax evaders by the German government in February 2010. The dependent variables are tax revenues
of the self-reported income tax and various other taxes (Col. 1 and 2: capital income withholding tax;
Col. 3: payroll tax; Col. 4: other withheld income taxes) of the 16 German states in thousand Euro, and
Treated = 1 indicates self-reported income tax revenues. Columns (1), (3) and (4) use tax revenues at
the yearly level for 2009 and 2010, Col. (2) quarterly data from the same period. All regressions are
run with an intercept. p-values are in parenthesis and are based on a wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron
et al., 2008).∗∗∗ and ∗∗ indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Column (2) includes
quarterly fixed effects.
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